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What might a "comparative perspective" upon international law
mean, or reveal? The phrase evokes the tradition of "comparative
law" with its related methods and purposes. That tradition is
rooted in the study of national legal systems. Scholars within one
such system explore another or several others-a cross-cultural
inquiry serving both practical and broad scholarly aims. However
illuminating, these explorations cannot be viewed as indispensable to the study of national law. They stand at the periphery
rather than core of most students' or scholars' concerns.
Does a "comparative method" within international law serve a
similarly confined purpose? Or should we understand it as more
central and pervasive a phenomenon, even vital to a threshold inquiry into the nature, norms and processes for development of international law?
Such are the questions stimulated by this very useful book edited (and contributed to) by William Butler. Seventeen essays
develop doctrinal, jurisprudential and sociological perspectives
upon the meaning and relevance of a comparative method in international law.' Most of them address the formal legal contexts
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in which comparative inquiry has figured-the search for "general
principles" informing international law, the work of codification
conferences, the opinions of courts interpreting treaties creating
regional organizations. Some essays treat the historical evolution
of scholarly recognition of a comparative method's contribution to
understanding international law. A few attribute an ideological
function to comparative analysis-for example, an attempt to describe capitalist values expressed within Western legal systems
as universal norms. Other essays note the contribution of a comparative method towards understanding the ideological tensions
within international law.
This range of informative perspectives constitutes the book's
significant contribution to the study of international law. Of
course the essays vary in quality. The reader encounters some
repetition of viewpoints, even of illustrations-a likely if unfortunate feature of a group of essays devoted to one theme. But what
the book loses in the systematic development of a point of view
which a single author could have provided, it gains in informing
the reader how diverse are the historical, cultural and jurisprudential understandings of the employment of a comparative
method.
The essays implicitly suggest how differently we must understand the role of a comparative method in national and international legal systems. The discipline of "comparative law" holds a
special position within the study of national law. Viewed technically, it offers insight into alternative modes of legal orderinghow other (generally more similar than different) nations handle
the accident problem, or resolve tensions between freedom of
contract and the unconscionability norm, or approach issues of
choice of law, or design institutions to repond to problems of environmental damage, or regulate anticompetitive practices. Such
comparisons may serve a pedagogical purpose, or the practical
goal of contributing to reform of a national law. Foreign experiences expand the imagination, reveal alternatives, perhaps point
the way.
Alternatively, the study of comparative law within national settings may deepen one's understanding of law itself, through the
awareness it develops of diverse national traditions, substantive
conceptions, institutional structures, legal ideologies. By viewing
a national system in a comparative context, the student understands it the more deeply. Comparative law, writ large, merges
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into comparative legal sociology or the comparative social theory
of law. It becomes equivalent in a cross-cultural sense to historical study that examines law in its relationship to periods in a nation's development in a vertical rather than a horizontal
dimension.
How then is a comparative method to be understood in an international context? In what ways might it inform normative argument about international law? Does an answer depend on
whether argument relies on norms that are based on a positivist
conception of custom, or on treaties, or on postulates of right or a
goal of welfare maximization?
The cautious and traditional response would point to an obviously relevant text that figures in several of the essays, Article
38(1) of the International Court of Justice's Statute.2 Clause (c)
instructs the Court, "whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law," to apply the "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." The traditional and perhaps
dominant interpretation of that clause directs judicial inquiry to
principles within national legal systems, characteristically principles of "private law" such as res judicata or estoppel. That inquiry looks to the derivation of international-law principles from
those internal to (many or representative) national systems. It is
"comparative" in the strict and conventional sense.
This initial response, both accurate and inadequate, should expand to embrace a more spacious conception of the method and
functions of comparative research. Consider, as do several essays, as basic a feature of international law as custom. Clause (b)
of Article 38(1) instructs the Court to apply international custom
"as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Characteristically, diplomatic officials, lawyers or judges would proceed upon
positivist premises to identify customary norms. They would look
to interactions among states creating patterns of conduct or abstention that build expectations of continuity, coupled with a
sense of obligation of those states to continue to act consistently
with them-a sense of normativeness. The interactions at once
constitute a practice and create a norm.
This positivist approach-with its stress on the consent of
states expessed through their practices-is inherently "compara2. The Statute, annexed to the Charter of the United Nations, is set forth in
59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T.S. No. 993 (at p. 25).

tive" in nature. It looks both to the comparison and aggregation
of practice. Is a practice sufficiently "general" to support a universal norm binding all? Which states have "accepted" it in their
relations with other states or in their internal legal systems? Unlike the use of "comparative law" to give content to clause (c)-to
reveal shared principles of national law governing intrastate conduct-the method as here employed stresses conduct and normativeness in the interstate arena, between states. It is
"comparative" nonetheless.
Between these confined and spacious understandings of a comparative perspective-general principles of national law, practice
among states to identify customary norms-lie the numerous illustrations recurring through these essays of resort to comparative inquiry to resolve issues of or to develop international law.
Codification through multilateral treaties frequently follows research into the internal and external practices or norms of states.
The negotiation of treaties on establishment or enforcement of
judgments must build upon (and modify) internal norms and institutions of the prospective parties. Descriptions of institutions
such as the corporation created under differing national lawsand hence comparison of those laws-may be indispensable to
the application of international-law norms such as those governing diplomatic protection. Interpretation of a multilateral
treaty may depend upon the internal practices of its parties in
giving it effect. Within regional organizations such as the European Community the elaboration of norms by legislative or judicial organs will draw upon the codes, legal cultures and
constitutional traditions of the member states.
This catalog of illustrations could grow, but its point is made. If
we mean by a comparative method the investigation of the formal
legal systems or the broader practies and legal-political cultures
of different nations, then the method inheres in the study of international law. It is vitally a part of the scholar's, diplomat's, advocate's or judge's inquiry. It lies at the core rather than the
periphery of study. It is neither narrowly practical nor broadly
cultural, but simply inescapable.
The method is inescapable because of the most rudimentary
characteristics-legal, political, historical-of international law.
Tensions exist in the international legal system between national
sovereignty and supranational rules, between autonomy and international regulation, between individualism and community
(both writ large). The source of international legal norms lies
within, rather than in phenomena independent of, the conduct,
principles and aspirations of states composing the international
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system. The legitimacy of those norms stems in important part
from their origin, in one form or another, within state practice or
national legal orders. These observations hold whatever may be
one's jurisprudential or political point of departure towards legitimating international law: positivism, some variant of natural law,
other ideal norms. Even ideal norms find their initial expression
within national systems.
The briefest comparison between the international system and
a federal nation underscores this point. One cannot equate international decisionmakers (who of course include interacting national officials as well as officials of international organs) with the
relatively autonomous federal lawmaking authority within a nation such as the United States-whatever the political metaphor
of social contract to legitimate the federal norms or the historical
origin of the Constitution in the consent of constituent states.
The interests of the fifty states are represented in a more complex
and organic way within the federal government. But much international decision-making continues to be the work of interacting
state officials, whether through the formation of custom, the negotiation of treaties, or their representative participation in international institutions.

Of course the international legal system possesses some autonomous character. Its structure of customary or treaty rules con-

stitutes a normative system distinct from (and hierarchically
superior to) those of states. Slowly it achieves some degree of in-

stitutional autonomy-more strikingly in regional than in global
organizations. Nonetheless, absent an international government

including executive and legislative as well as judicial organs, the
normative argument about international law of advocates or
judges necessarily draws upon national practice and law, directly
or indirectly.
The sustaining forces of international law lie within those very
states which are its principal subjects-in their interests, power,
or principles. Even within a more developed form of a regional
international organization-treating economic integration, human

rights, and so on-the tension survives in all organs of its government. Even there, attention to diverse national laws, traditions
and ideologies remains inescapable. Explicitly or implicitly, the

creation of or argument about international norms continues to
invoke a comparative method.

When legal argument rests less upon an empirically oriented
positivism than upon ideal norms-such as reliance upon naturalright postulates to urge recognition of particular human rights-it
nonetheless profits from the support that comparative inquiry offers. The ideal and the extant interact pervasively and complexly
in the international as well as national systems. The realization
in the practice or laws of many states of ideal norms fortifies such
international-law argument. Acceptance of a particular humanrights norm within many or representative national traditions
both nourishes the argument for an international norm and defends the advocate against a charge of a provincial conception of
right.
Of course comparative inquiry hardly "resolves" internationallaw problems. Comparison may yield irreconcilable conflicts
among interests and ideologies, or "shared" principles expressed
on so abstract a level (perhaps "unjust enrichment") as to escape
ready specification of the principle to resolve the problem at hand
(perhaps compensation for expropriated property). But it is indispensable nonetheless. Comparison exposes the roots of
problems in divergent legal conceptions or reasoning, concepts of
the right or good, or interests. It thereby constitutes a necessary
first step towards resolution. At a minimum, it can clarify what is
at issue. Perhaps comparative inquiry can penetrate the opposition of formal normative claims and expose the substantial
grounds for opposition. Perhaps it can offer points of departure,
or reveal a fund of human experience out of which international
legal norms may develop.
Leading treatises and casebooks on international law suggest,
however, that the student is led to a narrow and misleading perception of how comparative analysis informs international law.
Custom, treaty interpretation, or the exploration of the roots of
disputes in differing national interests or ideology are treated as
distinct from Article 38(1) (c), which itself becomes the classic
and proper illustration of the use of "comparative law." Surely
this collection of essays goes far to repair that misunderstanding.
Perhaps the problem can be viewed simply as one of definition,
i.e. what we mean by a comparative method. But it reaches more
deeply. The student, diplomat or judge must guard against a tendency to perceive the international legal system as autonomous,
as providing its own internal materials for decision. International
law's political foundation and normative structure do not yield a
substantive and institutional autonomy analogous to the federal
government's vis-A-vis the fifty states-no political structures
closely analogous to a national congress, executive, and judiciary.
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We must see the international system in its continuing dialectic
with national law and power. In its content and growth, it is at
once distinct from and dependent upon national system, separate
and bound.
By definition, any normative system must achieve more than
the description or rationalization of the behavior of those subject
to it. It must constitute a source of both criticism and justification
of behavior. But international law's influence upon the behavior
of states suffers from its political and institutional fragility. The
critical power of its norms is both independent of and derived
from national power, interests and law.
These varied essays nourish that perception. By viewing a
"comparative method" spaciously, they do more than expand the
definition of the term "comparative." They say something significant about international law itself.

